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Inclusion of Interest in State Tax
Refund Awards: "What's Good For
The Goose
I.

Introduction

The question of interest [on tax refunds] is one much more
often passed upon than carefully considered by courts. It is usually presented only incidentally to much more important issues,
and often decided one way or the other at the close of exhaustive
investigation of the other questions, and with the perhaps unconscious feeling that it is not of sufficient magnitude to justify further
serious labor.'
The ability of a taxpayer to receive interest on a tax refund has
traditionally been of little consequence and many contemporary
courts continue to give the issue summary treatment. 2 With the advent of high tax rates and high interest levels, however, the attention
of the tax practitioner has focused on the right of the taxpayer to
recover taxes paid, but not owed, to the government. The prudent
practitioner is also concerned about the recovery of interest in addition to the principal when taxes are held by a government entity during litigation which concludes with an award of a tax refund.
Tax schemes usually require a taxpayer who is delinquent or
deficient in tax payments to pay interest from the due date to the
eventual payment date.3 Basic notions of fairness mandate that the
governments include accumulated interest with tax refunds. That
simple rule of reciprocity has been avoided in many American jurisdictions, based upon a myriad of legal and policy concepts. Although broadly accepted principles guide the law concerning tax
refunds and interest thereon, the application and interpretation of
the principles have resulted in a sharp divergence of opinion on refund allowance and interest liability.
1. Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 178, 79 N.W. 327, 332 (1899).
2. See Commonwealth v. Meadville Co-operative Ass'n, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 257, 370
A.2d 1225 (1977) (summary denial of interest); Allegheny County, Southern District, Tax Assessment Appeals, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 291, 298 A.2d 643 (1972).
3. I.R.C. § 6601(a) provides:
If any amount of tax imposed by this title (whether required to be shown on a return,
or to be paid by stamp or by some other method) is not paid on or before the last date
prescribed for payment, interest on such amount at an annual rate established under
section 6621 shall be paid for the period from such last date to the date paid.
See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 806 (Purdon Supp. 1980).

The problem is acute in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
where the courts employ illogical and unwieldy common-law principles to decide statutory tax refund claims.4 The Pennsylvania judiciary persists in applying two directly polar views on the interest
liability issue.
The threshold question in evaluating interest refund cases is
whether the taxpayer will be able to obtain a refund at all. Tax refund law is based on common-law concepts, but statutes and administrative regulations are also applicable. The second issue is whether
the sovereign government will include interest with the payment of a
tax refund. Since few statutes address this issue, common-law views
will be compared and critiqued. Third, the courts that allow interest
to be paid must then determine the date from which the taxpayer is
entitled to collect interest.
This comment will contrast jurisdictional common-law views on
refund and interest liability that ascribe different weight to considerations of state sovereignty, fiscal responsibility and fairness. Statutory attempts to clarify the common-law quandary will be
considered and analyzed. The liberal approach of the federal tax
law is particularly worthy of attention5 as a comprehensive response
to be used by the unsettled jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania.
II.

Traditional Principles of Tax Refunding and Interest Liability

A.

Allowance of Tax Refund

Accepted judicial sentiment with respect to the refunding of
taxes and the payment of interest thereon is founded upon two basic
principles. First, it is the general view that there is no requirement
that the government refund amounts in excess of actual tax liability
when voluntarily paid by a taxpayer.6 This traditional view is based
primarily on an "indian-giver" notion that one who intentionally
gives something to another may not, at a subsequent time, demand a
return of the item.'7
B.

Incidence of Interest Liability

The second, and more tenuous, principle is that interest will be
awarded against the sovereign only when there is consent by the leg4. See notes 111-15 and accompanying text infra.
5. See section IV infra for a complete discussion of the federal treatment of tax refunds
and interest liability.
6. For a dated, but thorough, discussion of the common-law refund rule, see generally
Annot., 64 A.L.R. 9 (1929) (supplemented by Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1040 (1961)).
7. In Peyser v. New York, 70 N.Y. 497, 501 (1877) the court reasoned:
A person shall not be permitted, with the knowledge that the demand made upon
him is illegal and unfounded, to make payment without resistance, where resistance
is lawful and possible, and afterwards to choose his own time to bring an action for
restoration, when perchance, his adversary has lost the evidence to sustain his side.

islature to pay interest.8 This view dates back to English common
law9 and has been justified on grounds of "public convenience."'"
There are six articulable viewpoints from which this interest liability has been evaluated, each differing slightly with respect to the
type of factors being considered. Implicit in the traditional rule
which denies the receipt of interest are social, governmental,
financial and administrative concerns. Considered from either an
egalitarian or individualistic perspective, however, a persuasive argument exists in favor of including interest on tax refund awards.
1. Basis for Interest Denial.-In Schlesinger v. State," a
leading American case to address the interest issue, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court set forth the social and historical view of interest
which, absent an express grant of power to the contrary, mandated
denial of interest on claims against the government. This approach
comes from the English common-law rule that the charging of
interest constituted the criminal offense of usury.' 2 It is not
surprising, therefore, that the government did not participate in this
offense; payment of interest on its debts or on tax refunds was simply
refused. This social theory, however, has little merit in view of
current acceptance of reasonable interest charges.
Refusal to include interest in a tax refund award has also been
justified on the basis of governmental supremacy or sovereign
immunity. An early Supreme Court statement' 3 reflects this
viewpoint.
The inherent vice in the cases that hold the state liable to pay
interest in the absence of a statute or contract imposing that liability is in the assumption that the taxpayer and the government
stand upon an equality with respect to interest. The truth is that
in its dealings with individuals public policy demands that the
government should occupy an apparently favored position.'"
Financial and administrative concerns have also supported denial of interest payments. Simple concepts of sound fiscal management require the governmental entity to minimize expenditures by
declining to pay interest as a matter of policy. The courts express
8. Interest, when not stipulated for by contract, or authorized by statute, is allowed
by the courts as damages for the detention of money or of property, or of compensation, to which the plaintiff is entitled; and, as has been settled on grounds of public
convenience, is not to be awarded against a sovereign government, unless its consent
to pay interest has been manifested by an act of its legislature, or by a lawful contract
of its executive officers.
United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211, 216 (1889). See also Angarica v. Bayard, 127
U.S. 251 (1888); United States v. Sherman, 98 U.S. 565 (1878).
9. See, e.g., In re Gosman, 17 Ch. D. 771 (1881).
10. See, e.g., United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211 (1889).
11. 195 Wis. 366, 218 N.W. 440 (1928).
12. Id at 368, 218 N.W. at 442.
13. United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213 (1896).
14. Id at 218-19.

this view in terms of the obligation of the government to preserve the
"public fund." 5
Founded in pragmatism, the administrative or bureaucratic
concern is with the efficient functioning of the governmental system.
Advocates contend that the status quo, which requires payment of
tax assessments in advance of liability adjudication, is the only effective method of administering the tax law.' 6 This theory also holds
that the personnel costs involved in calculating and disbursing interest on tax refunds, and the potential abuse by taxpayers who might
deliberately pay tax in excess of their liability in order to receive the
standard rate of interest, cause interest refunding to be counterproductive. "
2. Basis for Interest Liability.-Principles of egalitarianism
and individual rights protectionism require the inclusion of an
average rate of interest on a tax refund judgment. The egalitarian
approach recognizes that reciprocal rights and obligations exist
between taxpayers and their government. Thus, when the taxpayer
must pay interest on tax deficiencies owed to the government, he
8
should receive interest on a refund of taxes.'
The individual protection view requires that interest be paid to
protect citizen-taxpayers from the government, a government which,
otherwise, could take a taxpayer's property (i.e. money) for an
indefinite period and be liable only to return the amount taken.' 9
15. See, e.g., Mercury Mach. Importing Corp. v. City of New York, 3 N.Y.2d 418, 429,
165 N.Y.S.2d 517, 523, 144 N.E.2d 400, 405 (1957) ("where the exigencies of public finance are
considered . . .we have concluded to . . .[deny recovery] . . .in the case of tax refunds").
16. See Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 436, 184 A. 37, 45 (1936)
where the court noted, "[Pre-payment] is a usual provision in tax statutes and must necessarily
be so, otherwise governmental operations might be seriously handicapped through lack of revenue due to unjustified actions of recalcitrant taxpayers."
17. In Socolow v. Murphy, 219 A.D. 184, 219 N.Y.S. 78 (1927) (modifying 127 Misc. 659,
217 N.Y.S. 210 (1926)) (question of interest liability addressed with reference to New York's
estate tax). The Appellate Division articulated the "deliberate overpayment" concern.
No doubt it would often be convenient for executors to deposit funds with the
state for an indefinite time, and obtain interest thereon at 4 or 6 per cent. But the
state is not a bank, and cannot be required to act as one without its knowledge or
consent. There is no custom and usage shown of paying interest on such refunds.
Id at 187, 219 N.Y.S. at 81.
18. State Tax Comm'n v. United Verde Extension Mining Co., 39 Ariz. 128, 132, 4 P.2d
395, 398-99 (1931) ("It is presumed that the sovereign state, in dealing with its citizens, intends
to apply the same rules of abstract justice as it applies in actions between citizens); Galveston
County v. Galveston Gas Co., 72 Tex. 509, 513, 10 S.W. 583, 587 (1889) ("we see no reason
why a county should not be subjected to the same measure of damages [interest] as would an
individual who had received and detained the money of another.").
19. It is not just that a tax-payer should be compelled to bear more than his share of
the public expense. He would bear more than his share if he lost, and the public
gained, a year's use of an excess by him paid. It could not have been the intention to
impose an unjust loss of a year's interest. Justice requires that there should be an
equitable adjustment of that loss.
Boston & M.R.R. v. State, 63 N.H. 571, 572, 4 A. 571, 572 (1886).

III.
A.

Divergent Jurisdictional Approaches
Comparative State Treatment of Tax Refunding

1 Common-Law Concepts.-Little uniformity exists among
jurisdictions on the circumstances which trigger a tax refund claim.
Based upon the "indian-giver" theory, however, a well-settled
generic rule can be stated. Absent a controlling statute, the right of a
taxpayer to recover a paid tax, license fee or other assessment
depends upon whether the payment was voluntary or made under
duress."0 This rule developed from the early tendency of the courts
to treat tax recovery suits like tort actions in which the taxpayer
seeks redress for the wrongful acts of the tax collector.2
The simplistic common-law rule is problematic when the courts
seek to interpret the meaning of "duress." 2 2 The general view is that
one who remits taxes to the government--except when a sheriff is at
his door--does so "voluntarily,"2 3 but there is a line of case law
which holds that the traditional notion of voluntariness ignores the
inherent duress that exists between a government and its citizens.24
"Duress," as used by these courts, does not require intimidation or
the use of physical power; rather it entails "that pressure of
circumstances which compels the will of man to yield to an
20. The dividing line between "voluntary" payment and payment under "duress" is
difficult to identify. The determination depends upon a factual analysis of the case. Courts in
the following cases found duress to exist: Soares v. City of Santa Maria, 38 Cal. App. 2d 215,
100 P.2d 1108 (1940); State v. Akin Products Co., 155 Tex. 348, 286 S.W.2d 110 (1956); and
Union Bag & Paper Corp. v. State, 160 Wash. 538, 295 P. 748 (1931). In the following cases,
however, the facts were deemed to show a voluntary payment: Rohde v. City of Chicago, 254
Ill. App. 590 (1929); Charlottesville v. Marks' Shows Inc., 179 Va. 321, 18 S.E.2d 890 (1942);
and Interstate Dep't. Stores, Inc. Y. Henry, 224 Wis. 394, 272 N.W. 451 (1937). But cf.
Manufacturer's Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kansas City, 330 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App. 1959) (recent trend
recognized toward liberalization of what constitutes "duress" to enable taxpayers to recover
more readily). See generaly Lichtenstein, Duress in Payment ofIllegally Levied Taxes, 68 U.S.
L. REV. 427 (1934).
21. See J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 703 (3d ed. 1969).
22. Even within an individual jurisdiction there is often inconsistency in defining which
tax payments are "voluntary" rather than under "duress." Compare Boone v. City of Tyler,
211 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (taxicab owner recovered taxes paid under local
ordinance which provided cab license forfeiture as the penalty for non-compliance with
Rainey v. City of Tyler, 213 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (taxicab owner denied recovery
of taxes paid under same ordinance as Boone v. City of Tyler because the trial court made no
finding of duress).
23. See cases at note 20 supra.
24. One of the first courts to recognize the duress inherent in citizen-government
relations was the District of Columbia court in Hill v. District of Columbia, 12 D.C. (7
Mackey) 481 (1889) in which the court stated:
To say that a man who pays money must be held to have acted freely unless he
did it under the pressure of immediate and urgent necessity suggests a high standard
or pluck and manhood, but in transactions with the government it is not a fair or
reasonable test. When a demand is made by an official known to have at his back,
even though he may not threaten to use them, the penalties of the law, the individual
citizen does not stand on an equal footing in the dealing.
Id at 482.

exaction."2 5 Payments that are seemingly "voluntary" are deemed to
actually result from apprehension over the consequences of noncompliance.
2. Statutory Schemes.-In an apparent attempt to clarify the
common-law rules, which are dependent upon an assessment of
voluntariness, various legislative enactments have defined the
circumstances in which a taxpayer may obtain a tax refund.2 6 The
legislatures have taken control of tax refund procedures through the
adoption of these statutes, determining when and by what
procedures taxes will be refunded. The statutes also designate the
tribunal to adjudicate refund claims, the format of refund petitions,
time constraints, and other administrative elements.
Being as disparate as the common-law decisions, however, the
corrective statutes simply contribute to the general confusion in tax
refund law. The statutes themselves are not amenable to
comparative analysis due to their divergence in technical procedures.
Likewise, judicial interpretations of the weight to be afforded the
statutes varies. While some state courts hold refund allowance
statutes to be remedial, requiring liberal construction,2 7 other courts,
including Pennsylvania courts, regard the authorizing acts as in
derogation of the common-law, necessitating strict construction.28
Furthermore, actions at law are still available in many states for the
recovery of erroneously paid or illegally collected taxes, 29 yet other
jurisdictions regard the statutory remedy as the "exclusive" and sole
relief available.3" Despite jurisdictional differences, codification of
refund procedures by individual states is superior to the confusing
and inconsistent common-law approach. Legislation at least gives
the tax practitioner a reliable frame of reference from which a
client's refund rights may be determined.
25. Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 250 N.Y. 29, 33, 164 N.E. 732, 733 (1928).
26. See note 92 and accompanying text infra for an example of statutory refund
provisions in Pennsylvania. See also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6901 (Deering); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 215.26 (West); N.Y. TAX LAW § 686 (Consol.).
27. Eg., Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Tracy, 118 Ohio App. 29, 193 N.E.2d 283
(1962).
28. Pennsylvania strictly construes tax refund statutes. See Arrott v. Allegheny County,
328 Pa. 293, 194 A. 910 (1937) (construing statute authorizing tax refunds by subdivisions of
Commonwealth). Accord, Box Office Pictures, Inc. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, 402 Pa. 511,
166 A.2d 656 (1961); Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, 376 Pa. 476, 103
A.2d 668 (1954).
29. See, e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa County, 104
Ariz. 166, 450 P.2d 103 (1969); Bret Harte Inn, Inc. v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 3d 14, 544 P.2d
1354, 127 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1976); Fisher-New Center Co. v. Detroit, 38 Mich. App. 750, 197
N.W.2d 272 (1972); Richmond v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 210 Va. 645, 172 S.E.2d 831
(1970).
30. See, e.g., Box Office Pictures, Inc. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, 402 Pa. 511, 166 A.2d
656 (1961); Atkinson v. State of Washington, 66 Wash. 2d 570, 403 P.2d 880 (1965).

B.

Comparative State Views on Refund Interest Liability

The codification of tax refund procedures has infrequently extended to addressing the interest liability issue. Some refund authorizing statutes specifically state when the inclusion of interest will be
available for the period of detention in a tax refund award. 3 In
these jurisdictions the courts must engage in statutory construction
and discern legislative intent. Elsewhere, however, the courts have
been left to divine a rule from common-law experience, which
proves to be a difficult task.
The determination of interest liability is only made after the
taxpayer has been found to be entitled to a refund. 32 The resolution
of this issue is characterized by conflicting policy considerations and
extreme opposing views.3 3 There is no general rule or majority rule
to apply.3 4 Even within individual jurisdictions the adopted common-law rules are not consistently applied. 35 Moreover, the jurisdictional inconsistencies are multiplied by early Supreme Court
pronouncements that a court may grant or deny interest on the equitable basis of "fairness and justice"3 6 on a case by case basis. For
31. Eg., VA. CODE § 58-1140.1 (Supp. 1979):
Interest on overpayments.-(a) Interest shall be allowed and paid upon the overpayment of any tax administered by the Department of Taxation, the refund of which is
permitted or required under the provisions of this article, at a rate equal to the rate of
interest then established pursuant to § 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended. Such interest shall accrue from a date sixty days after payment of the tax,
or sixty days after the last day prescribed by law for such payment, whichever is later,
and shall end on a date determined by the Department preceding the date of the
refund check by not more than thirty days. Notwithstanding the above, any tax refunded pursuant to a court order or otherwise as a result of an erroneous assessment
shall bear interest from the date the assessment was paid. Provided, further, that no
interest will be paid on sales taxes refunded to a dealer unless the dealer agrees to
pass such interest on to the purchaser.
See also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6901 (Deering); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62c, § 40
('West Supp. 1980); and N.Y. TAX LAW § 688 (Consol.).
32. Allegheny County, Southern District, Tax Assessment Appeals, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct.
291, 310, 298 A.2d 643, 653 (1972).
33. State Tax Comm'n v. United Verde Extension Mining Co., 39 Ariz. 136, 140, 4 P.2d
395, 398 (1931):
But the authorities are in hopeless conflict on the precise point as to whether, in
the absence of express statute allowing it, interest may be allowed against the state
from the date of payment in a suit to recover taxes paid under protest. The federal
courts, and those of Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, New Hampshire,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, apparently allow such recovery. On the other hand, those of California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Wisconsin seem to take the opposite view.
34. Compare 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 633 (1954) (interest usually recoverable on amount
refunded); and Annot., 57 A.L.R. 357 (1928) (interest allowed) with J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION 704 (3d ed. 1969) (taxpayer cannot receive interest).
35. In 1900 the common-law rule in California was that refund recipients were entitled to
receive interest. Mackay v. San Francisco, 128 Cal. 678, 61 P. 382 (1900). Two years later, the
California Supreme Court held the common-law rule denied interest on a tax refund in Columbia Say. Bank v. Los Angeles County, 137 Cal. 467, 70 P. 308 (1902). See also notes 111-27
and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the inconsistent holdings of Pennsylvania
courts.

36. Board of County Comm'rs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); Billings v. United
States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914).

example, the infusion of equitable principles has resulted in a denial
of interest on a laches theory, when the taxpayer3 has
been guilty of a
7
long, inexcusable delay in demanding a refund.
Roughly categorized, states with no controlling statute treat the
interest liability issue in three different manners: first, the government may be liable to pay interest; second, the government may be
immune from paying interest; and third, the state government may
not be held liable, but its political subdivisions must pay interest on
refunds.38
1. Government Liability View. -The rule that a government is
liable for interest is based on the presumption that a taxpayer should
receive interest when the state or a municipal body refunds all or
part of a tax paid but not due. The assessment of interest liability on
state governments is founded on notions of fairness and is variously
justified by courts. The prominent justification presupposes an
equality of footing in dealings between the sovereign and its citizens.
This presumption was articulated by the South Dakota Supreme
Court in Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha .R. Co. v.
Mundt3 9 in which the court awarded interest to a successful tax
refund claimant, even though the refund statute did not provide for
interest, stating:
It seems to us the fair, just and reasonable rule that, when the
sovereign submits itself to suit, unless the statute expressly provides to the contrary, it should come into court on the same basis
as to liability for interest4 and costs, in the event of adverse decision as any other suitor. 0
Alternatively, governments have been held liable for interest
based upon an implied consent theory. In In re O'Berry4 1 the New
York court found that interest should be included in a refund of
taxes collected under an unconstitutional tax law because "[t]he obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies
and carries with it the right to interest. Whenever money has been
received by a party which ex aequo et bono ought to be refunded,
the right to interest follows, as a matter of course." 42 The belief that
states have an implied duty to compensate taxpayers with interest is
also expressed by courts that rely on general tax or non-tax statutes
37. See, e.g., Redfield v. Bartels, 139 U.S. 694 (1891); Burrough v. Abel, 105 F. 366 (E.D.
Pa. 1900). But see, e.g., Boston and P.R. Corp. v. Gill, 257 F. 221 (Mass. 1916) (laches held
not to preclude recovery of interest).
38. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 823 (1963); Annot., 112 A.L.R. 1183 (1938); Annot., 76 A.L.R. 1012 (1932); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 357 (1928).
39. 56 S.D. 530, 229 N.W. 394 (1930).
40. Id at 531, 229 NW. at 395. The "equality of footing" rationale was similarly used
by the court in State Tax Comm'n v. United Verde Extension Mining Co., 39 Ariz. 136, 4 P.2d
395 (1931). See note 18 supra.
41. 179 N.Y. 285, 72 N.E. 109 (1904).
42. Id at 288, 72 N.E. at 110.

which provide for a statutory rate of interest to be paid on debt obligations.4 3 Under this approach a refund award is similar to a debt
obligation and will include interest.
Although the government liability view has been stated to be
the majority opinion," various jurisdictions complicate matters and
make the refund right tenuous by attaching administrative or equitable conditions to interest recovery.4 5 Failure to meet these rigorous
conditions results in a waiver or forfeiture of the right to recover
interest.
2 Government Immunity View-Conversely, the rule in many
jurisdictions is that, in the absence of a statute which specifically
creates interest liability, the government is immune from interest
payments and citizens are denied compensation for their loss.46 It
has been held that the rule denying interest on a tax refund is based
on the social view47 that interest, being a creation of statute, is
recoverable only by statute or contract.4 8
Another theory used to deny interest on a refund is that,
because interest is allowed only where there is delay or default on
the part of a debtor, interest awards carry a penalty connotation
which should not apply against the state. The inapplicability results
from the presumption that the state is "always ready to pay what it
owes." 4 9 Since these courts recognize no legal duty to refund the tax
until a final judgment is entered, the state is deemed not to have
delayed or defaulted during the pendency of the litigation. After a
refund judgment has been entered, however, the money is due to the
43. Courts have implied interest liability in two different ways when the statute under
which the refund is sought is silent on the interest issue. Some courts analogize to general nontax statutes which allow interest to be included in judgments. See Williams v. Harvey, 91
Mont. 168, 171, 6 P.2d 418, 420 (1931) (looked to general statute which provided "In an action
for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract .. . interest may be given in the
discretion of the jury."). Other courts have implied interest liability from the terms of the
statute under which the claim is brought. See Miller v. Clark, 37 Ill. App. 3d 29, 344 N.E.2d
698 (1976).
44. 84 C.J.S. § 633 (1954); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 357 (1928).
45. For one example of the administrative melee involved in a complete refund claim,
see note 73 and accompanying text infra.
46. See, e.g., People v. Union Oil Co., 48 Cal. 2d 476, 310 P.2d 409 (1957); Lakeftont
Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 167 N.E.2d 236 (1960); Herman M. Brown Co. v.
Johnson, 248 Iowa 1143, 82 N.W.2d 134 (1957); General Elec. Co. v. City of Passaic, 48 N.J.
Super. 604, 138 A.2d 545 (1958); Railway Express Agency v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1059, 87
S.E.2d 183 (1955).
47. See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
48. Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 167 N.E.2d 236 (1960). The Illinois
court also gave considerable deference to the interest of the "public fund." See note 15 and
accompanying text supra Cf.Milmar Estate, Inc. v. Fort Lee, 36 N.J. Super. 241, 248, 115
A.2d 592, 596 (1955) (requiring payment of interest on refunds would "result in disarranging
local budgets.").
49. Monarch Mills v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 149 S.C. 219, 223, 146 S.E. 870, 872
(1929) ("delay or default cannot be attributed to the government .... The apparently
favored position of the government in this respect has been declared to be demanded by public
policy.").

taxpayer and
the state is liable for interest from the date of the
5 °

judgment.

The fundamental doctrine used by courts to deny interest on
refunds is sovereign immunity; the rule that a sovereign state cannot
be sued in its courts without its consent. While most jurisdictions
have "consented" to suit for tax refunds, and some states have
repealed or abrogated the doctrine,5 ' the rationale is used as a basis
for limiting a claiming taxpayer to the refund rights provided by
statute. 2 If the payment of interest is not expressly provided by
statute, no right to interest will be recognized. 3 The Supreme Court
of Washington, in Columbia Steel Co. v. State,5 4 resolved its prior
inharmonious decisions by refusing to award interest on tax refunds
on the basis of sovereign immunity.
We are of the opinion that a sovereign state cannot be sued
without its consent, particularly in connection with the exercise of
its governmental functions. The right to sue the state, when accorded by statute, extends no farther than to grant the plaintiff the
right to bring his action and, if the evidence introduced before the
trial court is sufficient to establish the state's liability, to recover
against the state a judgment for the amount due, not including
interest unless
the payment of interest by the state is also authorized
55
by statute.

3. PartialImmunity View. -A limited number of jurisdictions
have adopted, either expressly or in practice, the position that the
state government is not liable to pay interest in the absence of a
controlling statute, but the subdivisions of the state (i.e. counties,
municipalities and localities) may be held liable.5 6 For example, the
50. Even though the subject of post-judgment interest recovery is beyond the scope of
this comment, it should be noted that some jurisdictions deny interest during the period of
refund litigation, but allow a refund award to bear interest from the entry of judgment of a
sum certain (subject to short processing period) until payment is made. See State v. Tennessee
Gas Transmission Co., 289 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); cf Columbia Sav. Bank v. Los
Angeles County, 137 Cal. 467, 70 P. 308 (1902) (judgment fixed the liability of the county so
that plaintiff was entitled to interest on the money detained from it from the date of the
judgment). But see Neubert v. Foxworthy, 71 11. App. 3d 438, 389 N.E.2d 898 (1979); Ford
Motor Co. v. Baker, 71 N.D. 298, 300 N.W. 435 (1941).
51. For recent developments concerning sovereign immunity, see generally Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1978); Comment,
Sovereign Immunity - Should the King Remove His Armour?, 53 N.C. L. REV. 1114 (1975);
Comment, State Sovereign Immunity: No More King's X, 52 TEX. L. REV. 100 (1973);
Comment, Virginia's Law of Sovereign Immunity: An Overview, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 429
(1978).
See also Discussion of Pennsylvania sovereign immunity, notes 132-35 and
accompanying text infra.
52. Public Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. 54, 149 A.2d 874 (1959); Schlesinger v. State, 195
Wis. 366, 218 N.W. 440 (1928).
53. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
54. 34 Wash. 2d 700, 209 P.2d 482 (1949), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 903 (1949).
55. Id at 712, 209 P.2d at 489 (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wash. 2d 700, 712, 209 P.2d 482, 489 (1949)
("counties are subdivisions of the state and do not enjoy the immunity from suit which
controls in regard to claims against a sovereign state."). A conflict also exists in the decisions
of the New Hampshire courts which can be reconciled by separating the cases on the basis of

South Carolina courts, without specifically making the distinction,
have ruled that the state is immune, 57 while holding that interest
must be paid on the refund of taxes levied by a municipal
corporation. 8
The equitable considerations which have infiltrated the interest
issue and the potential for anomalous court decisions cause the
preceding categories to be imperfectly circumscribed. This
uncertainty is compounded because of the judicial disagreement
over the date from which interest begins to accrue.59 Although there
is a semblance of agreement that interest must be paid if the actual
refund payment is not made immediately after the final refund
judgment,6" considerable disagreement exists with respect to prejudgment interest accrual. In some states interest liability begins
when the taxpayer makes his payment of the disputed tax
assessment.6 Other states allow interest only after the taxpayer
informs the government entity by making a refund demand.6 2
IV.
A.

The Federal Approach
Legislative Approach to the Common-Law Quandary

1. Allowance of Tax Refund 6 3-In the absence of statutory
authority, the federal courts have held that the government is not
whether the state or a political subdivision is the defendant. When the state is sued for a
refund, interest is not allowed. Public Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. 54, 149 A.2d 874 (1959);
Kaemmerling v. State, 81 N.H. 405, 128 A. 6 (1924). As against a municipality, however,
plaintiff's refund award may include interest for the period of detention. City of Franklin v.
Coleman Bros. Corp., 152 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1945); Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. City of Manchester,
70 N.H. 336, 47 A. 74 (1900).
57. Colonial Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129,
103 S.E.2d 908 (1958); Monarch Mills v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 149 S.C. 219, 146 S.E.
870 (1929).
58. Hay v. Leonard, 212 S.C. 81, 46 S.E.2d 653 (1948); Paris Mountain Water Co. v.
Woodside, 133 S.C. 383, 131 S.E. 37 (1925); Southern R.R. Co. v. Greenville, 49 S.C. 449, 27
S.E. 652 (1897).
59. For further discussion and case analysis relating to commencement date of a state's
interest liability, see generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 823 (1963).
60. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
61. E.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. New York Fin. Administration, 36 N.Y.2d 87, 324
N.E.2d 861, 365 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1975); Chicago and N.W.R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 85 S.D. 223, 180
N.W.2d 233 (1970); Family Hosp. Nursing Home, Inc. v. Milwaukee, 78 Wis. 2d 312, 254
N.W.2d 268 (1977).
62. E.g., Faith Evangelical Free Church v. County of Hennepin, 310 Minn. 276, 246
N.W.2d 439 (1976); Community Hosp. Linen Serv's. Inc. v. Comm'r of Taxation, 309 Minn.
447, 245 N.W.2d 190 (1976) (date of payment or date of demand; whichever is later); Hedberg
& Sons Co. v. County of Hennepin, 305 Minn. 80, 232 N.W.2d 743 (1975); Re Defenses and
Objections to Personal Property Taxes for 1969 Assessment, 303 Minn. 66, 226 N.W.2d 296
(1975).
63. See generally Brennecke, Taxpayers' Undeveloped Muscle - The Refund Suit, 47
NOTRE DAME LAW 304 (1971); Raby and Ellentuck, When Can the Tax Court be Used to
Obtain a Refund of an Overpayment, 36 J. TAx. 332 (1972); Stark, ClaimsforRefund of Federal
Taxes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 496 (1956).

required to refund taxes, even if illegally collected.' This commonlaw rule has been upheld even against the contention that a tax
assessment carries an implied promise to refund any amount paid in
excess of the tax liability.6" Although the common-law doctrines
have been largely abandoned in favor of statutes, Congress wields
the power to provide (or not provide) for tax refunds. Further,
Congress must delineate the prerequisites and procedures for
obtaining a refund6 6 and strict compliance with prescribed
regulations is required.6 7
Congress has incorporated provisions for the recovery of federal
internal revenue taxes since 1866, either through administrative
channels 68 or by a suit at law. Under current provisions, 69 when a
taxpayer pays70 a sum in excess of his tax liability the
"overpayment"
may be recovered by the taxpayer, either as a
credit or a refund, by filing a timely claim. 7 1 Although the federal
statute eliminates the "voluntary"/"duress" dichotomy, 72 procedural
obstacles grafted to the broad refunding provisions frustrate many
otherwise deserving refund claimants. One commentator noted the
problems caused by technical administrative rules, stating:
There can be many a slip betwix the cup and the lip in the process
of securing a refund of federal taxes. The field abounds in technicalities and courts generally have been reluctant to adopt an equitable approach where there has been a failure by the taxpayer to
comply with the various requirements of the statute and regulations. For this reason, the procedural aspects of securing a refund
64. See Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36 (1938); United States v. Michel, 282 U.S.
656 (1931); Reid v. United States, 211 U.S. 529 (1909).
65. The right of a taxpayer to a refund of an overpayment of a Federal tax depends
upon Federal law. Such right of a taxpayer and his right to interest upon such an
overpayment are founded upon a law of the United States and not upon a contract
express or implied. United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co .... ; Stone v.
White (citations omitted).
Nichols v. Comm'r of Corps. and Tax, 314 Mass. 285, 291, 50 N.E.2d 76, 82-3 (1943).
66. See Alexander Smith and Sons Carpet Co. v. Comm'r, 117 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1941);
Aldridge v. United States, 64 Ct. CI. 424 (1928) (under sixteenth amendment, Congress "had
power not only to provide the method of laying and collecting taxes, but the method of
refunding taxes illegally collected.").
67. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 115 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1940); Bush Terminal Bldgs.
Co. v. City of New York, 93 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1938) ("The right to recover taxes which
have been paid under protest is one which the state has the right to circumscribe narrowly
without contravening the Constitution.").
68. Authority for refunds, which first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1866, §§ 9, 13, 14
Stat. 98, 111, 152, and was later contained in Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(a), as amended, 64
Stat. 538 (1950), § 910, 53 Stat. 138, § 1027(a), 53 Stat. 156, § 3770(a)(1), as amended, 54 Stat.
1008 (1940), and § 3772(a)(1), 53 Stat. 465 (Now I.R.C. §§ 6402, 7422).
69. I.R.C. § 6402.
70. An "overpayment" exists when the amount paid as tax exceeds the correct tax. An
overpayment may arise in various ways, not all of which are obvious. Frequently,
overpayments (like deficiencies) are the result of lack of knowledge or understanding of the
law. See I.R.C. § 6401; Treas. Reg. § 301.6401-1, T.D. 7537 (1978). See generallyl [1979] 24
FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR 2d (RIA) [ T-5500; 34 AM. JUR.2d Federal Taxation 9180
(1980).
71. Statute of limitations provisions of federal tax law are located at I.R.C. § 6511.
72. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra

take 7on
3 as much or more significance than do the substantive
ones.

2. Interest Liability on Refunds.-The current federal statute
specifically includes interest both in cases of taxpayer deficiencies7 4
and taxpayer overpayments, 7 when the refund claimant has
perfectly complied with the mandated procedures. The overpayment
provision is generous, requiring interest to be paid on most refunds
or credits. Interest begins to accrue on the date of the tax payment.7 6
The present statute developed, however, from early federal
revenue acts which did not specifically authorize the federal
government to pay interest on tax refunds.7 7 Under the former acts
the federal courts were forced to develop and apply a common-law
interest liability rule. Consistent with the common-law refund rule,
the courts adopted the position that interest could not be paid in the
absence of statutory authority. 78 Thus statutory provisions are
permissive and strictly applied.
B.

Evaluation of Federal Statutory Scheme

Utilizing the criteria set forth in Section II,79 the federal statutory approach is commendable. The allowance of interest under the
Internal Revenue Code maximizes egalitarian and individualistic interests; the taxpayer and the government are placed on equal footing.
Furthermore, under the federal scheme when property is wrongfully
73. Stark, ClaimsforRefund of FederalTaxes, 41 IowA L. REv. 496, 522 (1956). See also
Baker, Proceduraland JurisdictionalAspects of Seeking a Tax Refund, 10 TULSA L.J. 362
(1975).
74. I.R.C. § 6601:
(a) General rule.-If any amount of tax imposed by this title (whether required
to be shown on a return, or to be paid by stamp or by some other method) is not paid
on or before the last date prescribed for payment, interest on such amount at an
annual rate established under section 6621 shall be paid for the period from such last
date to the date paid.
75. I.R.C.§6611:
(a) Rate.-Interest shall be allowed and paid upon any overpayment in respect
of any internal revenue tax at an annual rate established under section 6621.
76. I.R.C. § 6611(b):
(b) Period.-Such interests shall be allowed and paid as follows:
(1) Credits.-In the case of a credit, from the date of the overpayment to the due
date of the amount against which the credit is taken.
(2) Refunds.-In the case of a refund, from the date of the overpayment to a
date (to be determined by the Secretary) preceding the date of the refund check by
not more than 30 days, whether or not such refund check is accepted by the taxpayer
after tender of such check to the taxpayer. The acceptance of such check shall be
without prejudice to any right of the taxpayer to claim any additional overpayment
and interest thereon.
77. Interest was first allowed on federal tax refund by Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No.
67-98, § 1324(a), 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
78. See United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654 (1947); United States
v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947); United States v. North Carolina, 136
U.S. 211 (1889); Dresser v. United States, 180 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1950); Bertelsen & Petersen
Eng. Co., 60 F.2d 745 (lst Cir. 1932).
79. See notes 6-19 and accompanying text supra

withheld - whether by the taxpayer or the sovereign - compensation
in the form of interest must be given.
Similarly, financial and administrative concerns have not
caused problems under the federal system.80 It is clear that liberal
refund and interest provisions cause a large amount of money to be
refunded to taxpayers. 8' Although the federal treasury is depleted,
the refunds represent overpayments to which the government had no
legal claim in the first instance. When included, 82 the interest refunds represent restitution for a portion of the benefit derived by the
government from the use of the taxpayers' money. The liberal federal rules also encourage pre-payment of taxes, easing administrative
and enforcement difficulties.83
Furthermore, the governmental concern for retention of sovereign privilege is not disserved by the allowance of interest and refunds. The right to refund and interest is deemed by the courts to
exist solely by virtue of the statute. 84 Thus, sovereign control is retained because the Congress may narrowly define
the right, impose
85
rigorous regulations or repeal the right entirely.
V.

Pennsylvania Taxpayers' Rights

A.

Allowance of Tax Refunds

1. Common-Law Experience.-Historically,
the ability of
Pennsylvania taxpayers to recoup taxes paid, but not owed, to the
government has been extremely narrow. 6 Commonwealth courts
have recognized the well-established common-law rule that taxes
paid to the government should not be refunded. 87 The courts have
80. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
81. For fiscal year 1978, pursuant to § 6402, the Internal Revenue Service paid refunds of
$39.6 billion to 69 billion taxpayers. B. BITrKER AND L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
1142 (5th ed. 1980).
82. For administrative reasons, interest on federal tax refunds does not begin to accrue
until 45 days elapse. See I.R.C. § 661 1(e):
(e) Income tax refund within 45 days after return is filed. If any overpayment of
tax imposed by subtitle A is refunded within 45 days after the last date prescribed for
filing the return of such tax (determined without regard to any extension of time for
filing the return), or, in case the return is filed after such last date, is refunded within
45 days after the date the return is filed, no interest shall be allowed under subsection
(a) on such overpayment.
83. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
84. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
86. For a discussion of the common-law and statutory development of tax refunds in
Pennsylvania see Bachrach, Taxation, 22 U. PITT. L. REV. 173, 185 (1960).
87. See Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Board of Fin. and Revenue, 376 Pa. 476, 480, 103 A.2d
668, 669 (1954) ("If the payment was a voluntary one, it may not be recovered unless a statute
so provides."). Accord, Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, 359 Pa. 319, 59 A.2d 124 (1948);
Hotel Casey Co. v. Ross, 343 Pa. 573, 23 A.2d 737 (1942); Penn Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n. v.
Tax Review Bd. of Philadelphia, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 530, 336 A.2d 907 (1975); Hazelton Nat'l.
Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 308 A.2d 195 (1973).

excepted from this harsh rule instances in which taxes were paid
under "duress" from a collection agent.8 8 Specifically, the
Pennsylvania taxpayer could recover the tax payment only if two
conditions were met. 9 First, the tax assessment itself must have
been determined to be void, and second, the tax payment must have
been compelled by force.
As in other jurisdictions, the concepts of "voluntariness" and
"duress" proved difficult to apply consistently.9 ° Furthermore, the
common-law remedy was largely inadequate because no cash
refunds could be made. The Commonwealth could only credit the
overpayment to the taxpayers' future tax liability.9 ' From this
common-law confusion the statutory treatment of tax refunding
emerged.
2. Statutory Refund Scheme.-Since 1929, the Pennsylvania
Legislature has enacted one set of refund procedures as against the
state treasury, while treating separately the law which governs
refunds of taxes paid to political subdivisions.9 2 In both instances
the current law authorizes the granting of refunds, but the conditions
under which refunds will be paid vary significantly between the
categories.
(a) Refunds from political subdivisions.-- County governments
have operated under a legislative mandate to refund "erroneously or
inadvertently paid . . . taxes on real or personal property" since
1929. 9 3 Subsequent amendments in 194394 and 195791 broadened
88. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
89. Royal McBee Corp. Tax Case, 393 Pa. 477, 143 A.2d 393 (1958); Wilson v.
Philadelphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937); Shenango Furnace Co. v. Fairfield
Township, 229 Pa. 357, 78 A. 937 (1911); Riverside Iron and Steel Corp. v. Monongahela, 7 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 269, 298 A.2d 918 (1973).
90. "Despite its usual insistence that 'voluntary' tax payments can be recovered only in
strict accordance with terms laid down by the legislature, the court is not beyond stretching the
rule in order to give a tax refund where it feels the equities are strongly with the taxpayer."
Bachrach, Taxation, 23 U. Prrr. L. REV. 331, 348 (1961).
In Hartzfeld v. Snyder Township School Dist., 403 Pa. 632, 170 A.2d 355 (1961) the court
allowed recovery by the taxpayer after wrestling with the meaning of voluntariness. In that
case the court recognized an "active misrepresentation" by the School District in the
assessment procedure which made the taxpayer remittance "erroneous." Id at 634, 170 A.2d
at 356.
91. Bachrach, Taxation, 22 U. Pirr. L. REV. 173, 181 (1960). Now the Commonwealth,
through the Board of Finance and Revenue, is authorized to refund in cash or credit the
taxpayer's account. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 503(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
92. See The Fiscal Code of 1929, Act No. 176, § 503, 1929 PA. LAWS 343 (authorizing
Board of Finance and Revenue to decide refund petitions); Act of 1929, Act No. 518, § 1, 1929
PA. LAWS 1656 (authorizing county commissioners to refund taxes).
93. Act of 1929, Act. No. 518, § 1, 1929 PA. LAWS 1656:
Section 1. Be it enacted &c, That whenever hereafter any person or corporation
of this Commonwealth has erroneously or inadvertently paid or caused to be paid
into a county treasury, directly or indirectly, any tax or taxes on real or personal
property, under an assumption that such taxes were due and owing, when in fact such
taxes or a part thereof were not due and owing to the county, then in such cases the

the scope of the refund law to include all "political subdivisions" 9 6
and to encompass "taxes of any sort." 97 Significantly, however, the
1957 amendment eliminated the common-law remnant "erroneously
or inadvertently paid," substituting "voluntarily or under protest."9 "
Assuming the taxpayer makes a proper refund request within
the prescribed time period, the amendments have created a law
under which all money to which a political subdivision is not
lawfully entitled must be refunded. The taxpayer may bring an
action in assumpsit in a court of common pleas to compel local
authorities to pay the refund. 99
(b) Refunds of Commonwealth taxes.-In sharp contrast to the
generous refund provisions applied to local governments, taxes
mistakenly paid to the Commonwealth are more difficult to recover.
The Fiscal Code enacted in 1929, vested the Board of Finance and
Revenue with statutory authority to refund erroneously paid
taxes." °° These broad Fiscal Code provisions apply to all taxes,
county commissioners, upon due proof of any such erroneous or inadvertent tax
payment, are hereby authorized to draw their warrant on the county treasurer, in
favor of such person or corporation, to make refund of such tax or taxes to which the
county has no valid claim, out of the county funds.
94. Act of 1943, Act No. 162, 1943 PA. LAWS 349.
95. Act of 1957, Act No. 204, 1957 PA. LAWS 381.
96. The 1943 Act, note 94, supra,replaced "paid into a county treasury" with "paid into
the treasury of any political subdivision."
97. The 1957 Act, note 95, supra, replaced "any tax or taxes on real or personal property"
with "any taxes of any sort."
98. Act of 1957, Act No. 204, 1957 PA. LAWS 381, currently located at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 5566b (Purdon 1968) provides:
Whenever any person or corporation of this Commonwealth has paid or caused
to be paid, or hereafter pays or causes to be paid, into the treasury of any political
subdivision, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or under protest, any taxes of any sort,
license fees, penalties, fines or any other moneys to which the political subdivision is
not legally entitled; then, in such cases, the proper authorities of the political
subdivision, upon the filing with them of a written and verified claim for the refund
of the payment, are hereby directed to make, out of budget appropriations of public
funds, refund of such taxes, license fees, penalties, fines or other moneys to which the
political subdivision is not legally entitled.
Ostensibly, the 1957 amendment removed the need to consider "voluntariness" of payment in
evaluating a petition for a tax refund by any local government unit.
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5566c (Purdon 1968):
In the event of refusal or failure on the part of authorities of the political
subdivision involved to make any such refund of taxes, license fees, penalties, fines or
other moneys to which the political subdivision is not legally entitled, then the
aggrieved person or corporation shall have the right to bring suit for and recover any
such taxes, license fees, penalties, fines or other moneys to which the political
subdivision is not legally entitled, subject to the limitation herein provided by
instituting an action in assumpsit in the court of common pleas of the county wherein
such political subdivision is located.
100. Fiscal Code of 1929, Act No. 176, § 503, 1929 PA. LAWS 343, currently located at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 503 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (in part):
The Board of Finance and Revenue shall have the power, and its duty shall be,
(a) Except as hereinafter provided with respect to the Department of
Transportation, to hear and determine any petition for the refund of taxes, license
fees, penalties, fines, bonuses or other moneys paid to the Commonwealth and to
which the Commonwealth is not rightfully or equitably entitled and, upon the
allowance of any such petition, to refund such taxes, license fees, penalties, fines,

license fees, penalties, fines, bonuses or other moneys, except where
another tax statute contains independent refund provisions.
Essentially, the current Fiscal Code directs the Board of
Finance and Revenue to "hear and determine"'' refund petitions
and make refund payments from the Board's special appropriation.
The Fiscal Code's procedural requisites 0 2 must be strictly
construed10 3 since they derogate the common-law.' ° Moreover, the
Fiscal Code section is only mandatory to the extent that the Board of
Finance and Revenue must "hear" the refund petitions. The criteria
to be used in the determination are not codified. The courts must
therefore use common-law and equitable notions to ascertain
whether the Commonwealth is "rightfully or equitably entitled" to
the full amount paid by the taxpayer. 5
(c) Refunds under the sales tax law.-The vague concept of
"rightful entitlement" is also at the core of the specific refund
provision of the Pennsylvania sales tax act."° The sales tax
provision for refunds'0 7 is broader in scope and more directory than
the Fiscal Code. Section 252 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
"The Department [of Revenue] shall, pursuant to the provisions of
sections 253 and 254 [72 P.S. §§ 7253 and 72541 refund all taxes,
interest and penalties paid to the Commonwealth under the
provisions of this article and to which the Commonwealth is not
rightfully entitled."'0 8
Nevertheless, the notion of "voluntariness" has been relied
bonuses or other moneys, out of the fund into which such taxes, license fees,
penalties, fines, bonuses or other moneys were originally paid, or to credit the
account of the person, association, corporation, body politic, or public officer entitled
to the refund.
101. Id
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 503 (Purdon Supp. 1979). For a thorough analysis of the
administrative procedures involved in a refund claim under the statute, including time
limitations, pleading requirements, and conditions precedent to a suit, see Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Board of Fin. and Revenue, 60 Dauph. 511, af'd,368 Pa. 463, 84 A.2d 495 (1951).
103. Land Holding Corp. v. Board of Fin. and Revenue, 388 Pa. 61, 65, 130 A.2d 700, 703
(1957):
Where a State through its Legislature consents to be sued, the modes, terms and
conditions of the statute conferring such privilege and authorizing refunds must be
strictly construed and followed: FordMotor Co. v. Departmentof Treasury ofIndiana
et at, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); GeorgiaRailroad& Banking Co. Y.Redwine, State Revenue
Commissioner, 342 U.S. 299 (1952)..
Accord, Arrott v. Allegheny County, 328 Pa. 293, 194 A. 910 (1937); Commonwealth v. Rohm
and Haas Co., 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 430, 368 A.2d 909 (1977).
104. See Arrott v. Allegheny County, 328 Pa. 293, 194 A. 910 (1937) (construing Act
relating to refunds by county commissioners).
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 503(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979). See note 100 supra
106. Tax Act of 1963 for Education, Act No. 43, 1963 PA. LAWs 49, currently located at
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7101 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7252 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
108. Id For a discussion of the administrative procedures necessary to establish a valid
claim for a refund under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7253, 7254 (Purdon Supp. 1980), see
Commonwealth v. C.F. Manbeck, Inc., 87 Dauph. 66 (Pa. C.P. 1967).

upon to deny refunds under the sales tax law.' °9 To the degree that
the problematic common-law concepts are retained in judicial
analysis the various refund statutes do little more than codify
standards that are'confusing and difficult to apply.
B.

Incidence of Interest Liability

Although the legislature has codified the common-law refund
principles, the statutes are silent on the issue of refund interest liability. "10 Pennsylvania court decisions are inconsistent due to this lack
of statutory guidance. Currently there are two polar views prevailing on the issue. One view, based on the decision in Pennsylvania &
Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Tamaqua Borough School District"'
holds that "taxpayer is entitled to interest on the refund if no statute
or public policy militates against it."" 2 The opposing view, forcefully announced in Purdy Estate,113 adopts the "well-settled rule that
a sovereign state is not liable for interest in any case except where,
expressly or by reasonable construction of a contract or statute, it has
placed itself in a position of liability.""' 4
1. The Tamaqua Rule.-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Tamaqua considered a refund award in favor of the claimant Iron
Company for property taxes paid to the school district.
Characterizing itself as "unhampered by precedent""I' 5 on the refund
interest issue, the Court engaged in no independent consideration of
the legal question but adopted the view of "a recent note in 57
American Law Report,""' 6 which favors payment of interest on tax
refunds accrued from the date of demand by taxpayer to final
adjudication. " 7
109. Lilian v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 90, 311 A.2d 368 (1973); Hazelton
Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 308 A.2d 195 (1973).
110. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 503 (Purdon Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 5566b (Purdon Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7252 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
111. 304 Pa. 489, 156 A. 75 (1931).
112. Id at 496, 156 A. at 77. Accord, Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Pittsburgh, 449 Pa. 481, 297
A.2d 466 (1972); Rochester and Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Indiana County Bd. of Assessment, 438
Pa. 506, 266 A.2d 78 (1970); Jefferson Memorial Park v. West Jefferson Hills School District,
397 Pa. 629, 156 A.2d 861 (1959); Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, 359 Pa. 319, 59 A.2d 124
(1948).
113. 447 Pa. 439, 291 A.2d 93 (1972).
114. Id at 442, 291 A.2d at 95. The court in Purdy Estate found authority for the quoted
passage in Marianelli v. Gen. State Auth. 354 Pa. 515, 47 A.2d 657 (1946) (no interest on
arbitration award against General State Authority); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Smith,
350 Pa. 355, 39 A.2d 139 (1944) (no interest on arbitration award); Culver v. Commonwealth,
348 Pa. 472, 35 A.2d 64 (1944) (no interest on eminent domain award); Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 276 Pa. 12, 119 A. 723 (1923) (no interest when city sued Commonwealth to recover city funds spent on special election).
115. 304 Pa. at 495, 156 A. at 77.
116. Id at 496, 156 A. at 77. See Annot., 57 A.L.R. 357 (1928).
117. 304 Pa. at 497, 156 A. at 77. "It was not until then [the lower court judgment] that
plaintiff's right accrued, and the public funds should not be penalized by charging interest

Subsequent case law has often cited the language of the
Tamaqua decision." 8 The Tamaqua rule has been consistently
applied to authorize interest on refunds made by political
subdivisions to taxpayers," 9 even subsequent to the Purdy Estate
decision. The major point of contention in the
later cases has been
20
the commencement date of interest liability.
2. The Purdy Estate Rule.-Paradoxically, when a refund
demand is pressed against the Commonwealth itself, the language
used in Purdy Estate 2 1 surfaces to deny recovery of interest. In
recent years the commonwealth court has made use of the Purdy
22
Estate rule, notably in Commonwealth v. PhiladelphiaGas Works'
where that court actually advanced limited sovereign immunity to
distinguish 3between the Commonwealth and a political
2
subdivision.
In Cities Service the taxing authority was a municipality and not
the sovereign as in this case. The instant case is controlled by the
holding in Purdy Estate, that the sovereign is not liable for interest
unless a statute or contract, reasonably construed, provides for liability.' 24 (citations omitted)

One year later, in the leading case under the new sales tax law,
Commonwealth v. Meadville Co-operative Association,125 the Commonwealth Court followed the Philadelphia Gas Works decision,
without comment or analysis, to deny interest on a sales tax refund.
There remains a pressing need to develop a consistent rule regarding
the time span of interest accrual.
upon the amount due until plaintiff made a formal demand upon the proper authorities, giving
notice that it intended to exercise its right."
118. See note 114 supra.
119. See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Pittsburgh, 449 Pa. 481, 297 A.2d 466 (1972).
120. The generally recognized guideline is that "[tihere must however, be an improper
detention before it can be held that interest may accrue. There must be a formal
demand.
...Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, 359 Pa. 319, 326, 59 A.2d 124, 128 (1948).
Compare Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Pittsburgh, 449 Pa. 481, 297 A.2d 466 (1972) (detention was
improper from date tax was paid) with Pickar v. Owen J. Roberts School Dist., 4 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 273, 286 A.2d 13 (1972) (interest accrued from date of judgment declaring tax invalid).
121. 447 Pa. 439, 291 A.2d 93 (1972). See notes 113-14 and accompanying text supra.
122. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 66, 358 A.2d 750 (1976) (claim for refund of fuels tax).
123. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
124. 25 Pa. Commnw. Ct. at 71, 358 A.2d at 753 (1976). The Cities Service case cited in the
quoted passage is Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Pittsburgh, 449 Pa. 481, 297 A.2d 466 (1972). But see
Allegheny County Police Pension Fund v. Casey, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 175, 179, 362 A.2d 1136,
1138 (1976) (allowance of "damages and costs" under Mandamus Act is reasonably construed
to include interest). See also The Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital v. Commonwealth, No. 1666 C.D. 1976, Opinion by Judge Rogers filed July 8, 1980 (court reitterated the
apparently baseless distinction between refunds from the Commonwealth and refunds from
municipal taxing authorities).
125. 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 257, 370 A.2d 1225 (1977) (sales tax refund claim challenging
taxable status of agricultural cooperatives).

VI.
A.

Analysis and Recommendations
Elimination of Common-Law Remnantfrom the Refund Statute

Although overshadowed by the conspicuous divergence of views
on the interest liability issue, Pennsylvania's statutory refund procedures also require clarification. Codification of the refund rule provides a superior legal and administrative foundation compared with
the unsettled common-law principles. Further improvement, however, is still necessary.
The optimum revision would eliminate from the Fiscal Code
the need to resort to the common-law "voluntariness" inquiry. In
the true sense of the term, courts would be hard-pressed to find a
taxpayer who "voluntarily" pays tax dollars to a government entity.
The inequality of position in dealings between citizens and the government mitigates against any presumption or inference of "voluntariness." Under present law, however, a payment is deemed
"voluntary" unless the refund petitioner sustains the burden of proving "duress."' 2 6 This requirement imposes an unfair and illogical
burden.
To mollify this harsh law, the use of the federal "overpayment"
terminology' 2 7 in Pennsylvania would be advantageous and equitable. Fairness and logic dictate that whenever a citizen pays taxes in
excess of his liability, he should receive the excess back if he makes a
proper refund claim.
B.

Reformation of Interest Liability Law

The government interest liability issue is substantially more
troublesome than the refund allowance question. At the heart of the
problem are two opposing views, both tenable when separately considered, but wholly inconsistent when viewed together. 2 ' The
Tamaqua rule pre-dates the Purdy Estate rule, however, the allowance of interest recognized in Tamaqua has been followed subsequent to the Purdy Estate decision. The incompatible views require
judicial or legislative resolution.
The easiest approach would be to call upon the courts to decide
which rule will be followed. One rejoinder to such a suggestion
126. In tax refund claims, the rule is that the claimant must prove his case. This includes
proof of "duress." See Mfr's. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kansas City, 330 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. App.
1959): "Regardless of the liberalizing of the concept of what constitutes duress, according to
the cases in this state it is still necessary that the taxpayer, upon whom the burden of proof
rests, show that the payment was made involuntarily." See also State ex rel. S.S. Kresge Co. v.
Howard, 357 Mo. 302, 208 S.W.2d 247 (1947).
127. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
128. The theories referred to are the polar views represented by the Tamaqua and Purdy
Estate cases. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text supra.

would be that the judiciary is an inappropriate forum for the policy
evaluations necessary to making a rational choice between the views.
Regardless of whether the judiciary or legislature resolves the dilemma, three principal concerns must be balanced. Any resolution
of the issue must give attention to the interests of due process, sovereignty and pragmatism.
29
.. Due Process.-The touchstone of due process is fairness.1
Whenever a business or individual taxpayer is compensated for his
loss when tax dollars are held by the state during the pendency of
refund litigation basic notions of justice are offended. From a
compensatory perspective, it is beyond doubt that the taxpayer
suffers an economic loss.
Although the loss is frequently viewed as lost potentialearnings,
it is possible that the taxpayer will need to borrow money to pay the
disputed tax. For the duration of the administrative and judicial
proceedings the taxpayer continuously loses money at the prevailing
rate of interest on his debt. To award a refund of only the principal
amount of tax is an obvious injustice. In disputes over money
between two private parties Pennsylvania courts have consistently
held that one who wrongfully detains the money of another must
pay interest for the period of detention. 3 0
The inequity of the Purdy Estate interest rule is further evident
in the lack of reciprocity of the interest obligation. Fairness dictates
that when the Commonwealth requires interest to be paid on
deficiencies at a six percent annual rate,' 3' an equal rate of interest
should be paid on refunds of overpayments.

2. State Sovereignty.-Despite the recent reaffirmation by the
Pennsylvania General Assembly of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, 13 2 the judicial abrogation of the doctrine in 1978 in Mayle
v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways'3 3 exemplifies the current
judicial disinclination
to perpetuate preferential treatment for the
34
government.
An illustrative analogy may be properly drawn to the cases
129. See Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
130. See, e.g., Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 156 A.2d 865 (1959) (interest runs from date
of unlawful withholding); Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 608, 184 A.2d 24 (1962) (interest
runs from date of debtor's duty to discharge the debt).
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 806 (Purdon Supp. 1980) provides: "All tax and bonus due
the Commonwealth, as provided by law, shall bear interest at the rate of six per centum per
annum from the date they are due and payable until paid... "
132. See Sovereign Immunity Act of 1978, Act No. 152, § 2310, 1978 PA. LAWS 788
codified at 42 PA. C.S.A. § 5110 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
133.

479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).

134. Were we to continue to adhere to the doctrine of sovereign immunity in light of
its manifest unfairness and of our current knowledge that the doctrine is non-

which hold that interest can be included as an incident to an award
by the Board of Claims against a Commonwealth agency. Courts
have routinely allowed the inclusion of interest in Board of Claims
awards. 135 The court in Road Machinery, Inc. v. Commonwealth 136
determined the award of interest to be proper, stating:
Inherent in the broad powers given to the Board of Arbitration of Claims to resolve contractual disputes involving the Commonwealth, must exist the power to award interest. And,
particularly since the 1961 amendment, when payment of the
award may be delayed by an appeal, common fairness 37
requires
that interest continue to run until the award is satisfied.'
3. Pragmatism.-Viewed from the pragmatic perspective, the
legislative or judicial inclusion of interest in tax refunds would create
a situation comparable to the federal system.' 3 8 While financial and
administrative concerns rarely establish a basis for judicial decisions,
the legislature should be cognizant of the actual consequences of
allowing interest to be included in refunds. Any award of interest
would remove money from the "public fund" which historically has
been very closely guarded. 3 9 Arguably, however, the only funds
which would be drawn from the state treasury are funds earned by
using, investing or having available a taxpayer's overpayment. To
that extent, payment of interest should be viewed as restitution
rather than an expenditure.
Two administrative concerns likely to be raised, additional
work effort and potential abuse by deliberate overpayers,' 4° do not
merit consideration. In a system which has an existing refund
mechanism, the incremental work effort involved in computing and
including interest in refunds is not sufficient to jeopardize necessary
reform. The belief that taxpayers will make deliberate
constitutional, we would be blindly imitiating the past, for no reason better than that
this was the way justice was administered in the feudal courts of Henry III.
We therefore abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity and overrule all
inconsistent cases.
Id at 406, 388 A.2d at 720. See generally Comment, Judicial.Abrogation of Governmentaland
Sovereign Immunity. A National Trend with a Pennsylvania Perspective,78 DICK. L. REV. 365

(1973); Comment Sovereign Immunity and Governmental Immunity - Protecting the Government or the Governed, 35 U. Pirr. L. REV. 355 (1973).
135. See Commonwealth v. S.J. Groves and Sons Co., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 526, 343 A.2d
72 (1975); Gen. State Auth. v. Loffredo, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 237, 328 A.2d 886 (1974);
Commonwealth Dep't. of Property and Supply v. Berger, II Pa. Commw. Ct. 332, 312 A.2d
100 (1973). Cf.Pennsylvania Dep't. of Transp. v. DePaul, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 447, 371 A.2d
261 (1977) (interest may be awarded, but only from date the obligation arises).
The Board of Claims (formerly known as Board of Arbitration and Claims) is an
independent administrative body created to arbitrate contractual claims against the
Commonwealth. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 4651-1 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
136. 88 Dauph. 1 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
137. Id at 6.
138. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text supra.
139. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
140. See note 17 and accompanying text supra,

overpayments to secure the interest is similarly unconvincing for
three reasons. First, the current statutory rate of taxpayer
deficiencies, six percent per annum,' 4 ' is far below the rate of
investment returns in the private sector. Second, given the
complexity of the tax refund procedures,' 4 2 a deliberate overpayer
would substantially risk being unable to recover even the principal
of his "investment." Third, the cost of refund petitioning, and the
cost of refund litigation, far outweigh any potential financial benefit
to the overpayer.
A secondary practical policy decision is needed to determine the
43
commencement date of the Commonwealth's interest liability.
Although taxpayers would support the date of payment approach,
fairness and administrative considerations require that the taxpayer
notify the Commonwealth of his protest to the tax assessment before
interest liability begins.' 44 Regardless of the point in time selected,
codification of either view would be preferable to the uncertainty of
45
the status quo.'
C. Model Legislation
In partial recognition of the need to legislate on the interest liability issue, a bill has been placed before the Finance Committee of
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives to answer the liability
question with respect to income tax refunds."
Modeled after the
141.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 806 (Purdon Supp. 1980). See note 131 supra.
142. See notes 20-30 and accompanying text supra.
143. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
144. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
145. A tenable approach to the ascertainment of a commencement date for interest
liability could be based upon the opinion of Judge Robert E. Woodside in Koolvent
-Aluminum Awning Co. v. Pittsburgh, 192 Pa. Super. Ct. 650, 162 A.2d 256 (1960). Writing for
a unanimous court, Judge Woodside made an insightful distinction between tax refund claims
which challenge the propriety of the imposition of any tax and refund claims which challenge
the amount of the assessment.
In the second type of claim the court proceedings are necessary to establish the valuation
of property. Until the valuation occurs, there is no sum certain upon which to assess interest.
In these instances, "[ilt is reasonable to limit the interest on the refund to the period starting at
that time [valuation decision], for it is then that the right to the refund accrues." Id at 656, 162
A.2d at 259. Judge Woodside continued, however:
Here demand was made upon Koolvent for taxes which the law did not impose in
any amount. Koolvent, under threat of penalties and high interest, complied with the
demand which the taxing authorities never had any legal right to make. The
municipalities used Koolvent's money from April 14, 1955 to October 16, 1958, when
they repaid it without any interest.
When Koolvent sought relief from the court, it was making a demand for the
refund of an exact sum, representing a tax never imposed; it was not seeking a reevaluation of property upon which a legally imposed tax had been calculated ...
Applying equitable principles, there can be no doubt that interest should be allowed
from the time when the court below told the municipalities, by the entry of
judgments, that they never had any right to Koolvent's money.
Id at 656-57, 162 A.2d at 259 (emphasis in original).
146. See House Bill No. 1978, General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session of 1979, § 1
(1979).

federal statute,' 4 7 House Bill No. 1978 would result in two significant
changes. First, the drafters of the bill used the broad federal "overpayment" language 148 to avoid the common-law "voluntariness"
trap. 4 9 Second, the proposal specifically provides for the payment
of interest, at 6.9%per annum, on refunds of income tax overpayments held beyond a forty-five day processing period.
Although the future of House Bill 1978 is uncertain, 150 this bill
is an important step in the general direction of tax reform. More
comprehensive legislation is necessary. The most advantageous proposal would provide for the payment of a flexible rate of interest on
all refunds of any taxes after a refund processing period.' 5 ' Furthermore, legislation should incorporate a safeguard provision to preclude the allowance of interest when the refund claimant has
intentionally over paid his taxes.' 5 2
VII.

Conclusion

Obtaining a complete tax refund under current Pennsylvania
law involves an uphill battle, particularly if the claim is initiated
against the Commonwealth itself. Although refund claims are
brought under statutes, the failure of the legislature to depart from
the illogical and confusing "voluntariness" concept renders the statutes impotent to correct the common-law maladies. Moreover, even
a successful refund claimant receives an inadequate award because
of the consistent denial of compensatory interest when claims are
decided against the Commonwealth.
Deprivation of interest payment on taxpayer refunds would be
acceptable if a valid government concern was advanced under the
rule. In the present case, however, the refusal to mitigate a taxpayer's loss with interest is premised on the sovereign immunity doctrine which has been ruled unconstitutional and manifestly unfair by
15 3
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
147. I.R.C. § 6611. See notes 74-76 and accompanying text supra
148. See note 70 and accompanying text supra
149. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
150. House Bill No. 1978 was referred to the Finance Committee in the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives on November 14, 1979. No action has been taken on the bill to this
date.
151. An optimum proposal is embodied in the Virginia Interest on Overpayments statute.
See note 31 supra.
152. For suggested language of safeguard provision, see CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6908
(Deering):
Circumstances precluding allowance of interest
(a) If the board determines that any overpayment has been made intentionally or by
reason of carelessness, it shall not allow any interest thereon.
(b) If any person who has filed a claim for refund requests the board to defer action
on the claim, the board, as a condition to deferring action, may require the claimant
to waive interest for the period during which the person requests the board to defer
action on the claim.
153. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).

Interest on tax refunds is an incidental aspect of a tax refund
award, but current economic conditions make inclusion of interest
payments important to all taxpayers. Until there is corrective legislative action, the tax practitioner in Pennsylvania must be aware of
the confusing law and inconsistent court holdings on the interest issue and must strictly adhere to the technical rules of refund procedure if his client is to avoid a severe, inequitable result.
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